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The following brief glossary of key terms is provided as a ready reference, for anyone who needs a reminder during reading of some of my distinctive uses of terminology. The glossary here consolidates those in all four volumes. Any frequently used terms not in it can reasonably be assumed to follow a standard English dictionary definition. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This glossary does not include terms for cognitive biases and fallacies (except when they are coinages of mine), because these are largely shared with a wider intellectual tradition. Instead, these have been given in a separate glossary.<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Warning: Brief definitions have a value in initial learning and orientation. They are never absolutely adequate when closely analysed.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Absolutisation <\/strong>The interpretation of incremental experience in\nabsolute (i.e. non-incremental) terms<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Adaptiveness <\/strong>Ability to address a wide range of conditions (not\nmerely to survive or reproduce in different conditions)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aesthetic objectivity<\/strong> The aspect of objectivity (q.v.) applied to\njudgements of beauty (not a distinct type of objectivity, but a way that\nobjectivity in general can be applied).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Agnosticism <\/strong>The deliberate avoidance of either accepting or\nrejecting a claim, particularly a metaphysical claim. In Middle Way Philosophy\nthis term is roughly equivalent to hard\nagnosticism<\/em> used elsewhere. It does not imply either indecisiveness or an\nexpectation of further evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Agnostic foundationalism <\/strong>The requirement that a necessary (but not\nsufficient) condition for justification is the recognition that one may be\nwrong, either in positive or negative claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alienation<\/strong> An extreme conflict of desires created by repression\n(q.v.) of some desires by other dominant and socially supported desires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Antifragility <\/strong>(from Taleb) Tendency to be strengthened by\nunexpected and extreme conditions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Archetype <\/strong>A common psychological function that tends to be\nassociated universally with certain general types of symbol (e.g. the Shadow is\nthe psychological function of rejecting what lies beyond current\nego-identifications)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Asymmetrical integration<\/strong> The achievement of integration of one type\nor in one area to a greater extent than in another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Autonomy of facts (fallacy) <\/strong>Assumption of the autonomy of facts\nfrom values, regardless of their practical interdependence<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Basic-level categories <\/strong>Types of object habitually encountered in\nearly experience that then provide the basic model from which more complex\ncategorisation can be developed (e.g. tree<\/em>\nas basic level, turkish oak <\/em>as more\ncomplex)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belief <\/strong>A habitual motive combining meaningful symbols in a pattern\nof response that can be interpreted as a representation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cognitive bias <\/strong>A habitual distortion of judgement or delusion found\nto some extent in all human beings. Although the use of this term creates a\nhelpful connection with the psychological research on cognition, I do not\nconsider cognitive biases to be solely cognitive, nor a defect of\n\u2018rationality\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cognitive meaning<\/strong> The aspect of meaning that consists of\nrecognising a representational equivalent of an object or symbol <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cognitive model <\/strong>A coherent set of representations (q.v.), dependent\non linked beliefs and specific metaphorical extensions (q.v.), and creating a\nspecific and limited context for some aspects of meaning (e.g. \u2018Tuesday\u2019 given\nmeaning by a cognitive model of time including a seven-day week)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coherentism <\/strong>The requirement that a condition for justification is\nthe logical or explanatory coherence of a new belief with our existing beliefs.\nIn Middle Way Philosophy this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for\njustification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compassion <\/strong>The aspect of objectivity (q.v.) applied to the\nextension of identifications with ourselves or others. Objectivity, including\ncompassion, can be developed, whilst empathy (an emotional capacity) may be a\nresult of conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conditions <\/strong>The way things appear to be as they impact on us from\nthe outside (or inside) world. Many writers use the terms \u2018reality\u2019 and\n\u2018nature\u2019 for this concept, both of which I prefer to avoid because of their\nmetaphysical connotations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Confidence <\/strong>Faith (q.v.) that is justified on experiential rather\nthan metaphysical grounds<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Creativity <\/strong>The attachment of new desires to symbols (q.v.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defeasibility <\/strong>The possibility that the use of a linguistic symbol\ncould be wrong within the terms of a specific cognitive model (q.v.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defeasibility context <\/strong>The sphere within which a linguistic symbol\ncan be defeasible \u2013 another term for a cognitive model (q.v.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dialectic <\/strong>A process of uniting or synthesising apparently opposed\nentities, where both are assumed to address conditions to some degree but to be\nlimited by unnecessary opposed assumptions. In Middle Way Philosophy this is an\nepistemological process rather than a historical one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dispositional objectivity <\/strong>Objectivity (q.v.) seen as the\ncharacteristic of a person and their habits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dogmatism <\/strong>The psychological expression of metaphysics, where\nbeliefs are held strongly because they are thought to be intrinsically true,\nregardless of experience. Hence Dogma<\/strong>,\na metaphysical belief considered psychologically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Doubt <\/strong>Narrowly focused and fragile faith based on metaphysical\nassumptions, which may thus move discontinuously between brittle assertion and\ndenial<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dualism <\/strong>The belief (or implicit assumption) that a metaphysical\nunderstanding of experience is unavoidable, or even to be welcomed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ego <\/strong>Our experience of having wishes and identifications (with both\nourselves and others), including our desire to continue existing as a self<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Embodied meaning<\/strong> An understanding of meaning based on a recognition\nof how the physical body creates meaningfulness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Emotional (or emotive) meaning <\/strong>That aspect of meaning that consists\nin the capacity to focus energy on a symbol through attention<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Evil <\/strong>Morally negative experience of dogmatism and absolutisation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Experiential adequacy <\/strong>The extent to which our experience is able to\nunderstand conditions without interference from dogmatic assumptions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Explicit belief <\/strong>A habitual judgement that is consciously held as a\nrepresentation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Expressivism <\/strong>The belief that language only has expressive meaning\nderived from a relationship with a fixed self<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Factual objectivity <\/strong>The aspect of objectivity (q.v.) applied by an\nindividual to reach a degree of understanding of facts \u2013 that is, of how things\nare as far as we can ascertain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Faith <\/strong>The emotional dimension of belief (q.v.), which is\nfunctionally inseparable from belief<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fallacy <\/strong>Unjustified assumption (q.v. justification<\/em>) made in reasoning. Functionally equivalent to\ncognitive bias (q.v.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Falsifiability<\/strong> The potentiality for falsification (q.v.) of a\ntheory in a coherently imaginable scenario.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Falsification <\/strong>The justifiable (but not certain) conclusion that a\ntheory is wrong because of its incompatibility with evidence. In Middle Way\nPhilosophy falsification can be undertaken by individuals, not just by scientists\nusing strict research methods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fragility <\/strong>Tendency to be weakened by unexpected and extreme\nconditions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fragmentation of meaning<\/strong> The separation of meanings (i.e.\nsymbol-attachments) so that one fails to recognise the other, whether within\nthe individual or between individuals<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fulfilment <\/strong>The state of a desire when it has achieved the state of\naffairs represented in association with it, achievable only incrementally<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Group<\/strong> An association involving shared identifications between two\nor more people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Heron\u2019s Beard<\/strong> The principle that meaning should be allowed to\nlimitlessly proliferate, by our learning more symbols and\/or appreciating them\nmore fully<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Identification <\/strong>The sense of possessiveness towards oneself, a\nperson or an object, making them in some sense \u201cme\u201d or \u201cmine\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ideology <\/strong>Beliefs shared by a group<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Image schema <\/strong>Basic pattern in embodied experience that can be\nassociated with symbols to make them meaningful. E.g. the \u2018source-path-goal\u2019\nschema makes the word \u2018path\u2019 meaningful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implicit belief <\/strong>A habitual judgement that can be inferred from a\npattern of response but is not consciously held as a representation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Incrementality <\/strong>The conceptualisation of qualities as a matter of\ndegree on a spectrum, rather than as absolutes that are either existent or\nnon-existent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Incrementalisation<\/strong> The process of re-conceiving absolutes as a\nspectrum of qualities that are a matter of degree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Integration <\/strong>The progressive uniting of apparently opposed entities\nby incrementalising (q.v.) them and adopting the qualities of each to the\nextent that they address conditions. This is a dialectical process (q.v.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Judgement <\/strong>The forming of a representation or response that \u2018freeze\nframes\u2019 our experience and commits us to assuming a particular state of affairs.\nThis then enables us to act according to that assumed state of affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Justification <\/strong>The finding of adequate (though not certain) reasons\nto believe or disbelieve a claim. In Middle Way Philosophy this requires both\ncoherentism (q.v.) and agnostic foundationalism (q.v.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meaning <\/strong>The habitual attachment of desire to a symbol through the\nneural networks, physical associations, and cognitive models we have developed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Metaphorical extension <\/strong>Pattern of association between one a new\nsymbol and a more basic image schema<\/em>\n(q.v.) that makes the new symbol meaningful in embodied experience<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Metaphysics <\/strong>Positive or negative claims that are asserted without\nany possible justification (q.v.) from experience, using absolute claims or\nabsolute sources of justification (or their denial), and a lack of any\npossibility of incrementalisation (q.v.). The identification of metaphysical\nclaims is always dependent on context and use rather than just wording, and is\nnot independent of the psychology of the person believing them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Middle Way <\/strong>A philosophical and practical approach that avoids both\npositive and negative metaphysical claims, seeking to address conditions by\nadopting beliefs that go beyond the assumptions of both sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moral objectivity <\/strong>The aspect of objectivity (q.v.) that is applied\nto moral judgements as to how to live and act (not a distinct type of\nobjectivity, but a way that objectivity in general can be applied).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Negative feedback loop <\/strong>The process by which awareness of\nfallibility can create increasing objectivity (q.v.) of belief<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Negative metaphysics <\/strong>Claims about the non-existence of a\nmetaphysical (q.v.) entity beyond experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Non-dualism <\/strong>A philosophical and practical approach which avoids the\nassumption of absolute metaphysical entities or their denial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Objectivity <\/strong>The incremental (q.v.) quality of the judgement of a\nperson or group of persons that enables them to understand and address\nconditions (q.v.). In Middle Way Philosophy this term does not<\/strong> mean \u2018a God\u2019s eye view of the universe\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Optionality <\/strong>A state of judgement in which possible alternatives are\noffered by additional neural links in addition to the stronger ones that form\ncurrent beliefs<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Positive feedback loop <\/strong>The process by which metaphysical beliefs\nare reinforced by the effects of the narrowing of judgement that they create<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Positive Metaphysics <\/strong>Claims in support of the existence of a\nmetaphysical (q.v.) entity beyond experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pragmatism <\/strong>A philosophical approach that emphasises practical\nusefulness rather than adherence to an absolute view of how things are. In\nMiddle Way Philosophy this practical usefulness is understood in a long-term\nsense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Projection<\/strong> The process by which an object is assumed to have the\nmeaning of an archetype, despite the fact that the psychological function is in\nthe viewer, not the object<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prototype <\/strong>Typical representative of a wider category in symbolic\nassociation that creates the meaning of that category (e.g. \u2018robin\u2019 as\nprototype that springs to mind for \u2018bird\u2019)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Provisionality <\/strong>The psychological state of holding beliefs flexibly\nenough to enable them to be changed in the light of new evidence. This also\nrequires the avoidance of metaphysical beliefs because they cannot be held in\nthis way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Psyche <\/strong>The total potential identifications of a given ego, into\nwhich current identifications may be integrated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Representation <\/strong>A mental image which is believed to be equivalent to\na state of affairs of some kind beyond the mind<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Representationalism <\/strong>The belief that language has only cognitive\nmeaning gained from its representative relationship with the world (for example\nthrough truth-conditions).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Repression <\/strong>The denial of one desire by another, in which the\ndominant desire attempts unsuccessfully to completely eliminate the subordinate\none.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Revelatory metaphysics <\/strong>The type of metaphysical claim that appeals\nto an absolute (usually religious) source for its justification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scepticism <\/strong>The belief that no claims (or their denials) can be\ncertain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scientific Objectivity <\/strong>The aspect of objectivity (q.v.) which is\napplied to theoretical judgements about the universe using scientific method\n(not a distinct type of objectivity, but a way that objectivity in general may\nbe applied). Some of this objectivity may be individual, some the quality of\nscientists as a group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sublimity <\/strong>A strong temporary experience of meaningfulness in which\npreviously separated energies are joined in relation to a symbol<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suppression <\/strong>The aware and temporary adoption of one desire as\ndominant over another, and denial of immediate expression to the subordinate\ndesire. This is distinguished from repression (q.v.) by continuing recognition\nof the subordinate desire. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Symbol <\/strong>Any object that is experienced as meaningful, e.g. words,\npictures, sounds, other significant objects<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Synthesis<\/strong> Combining of beliefs through critical and mutual\nengagement, when those beliefs would otherwise be separated (for example,\nbecause they are in different cognitive models)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Temporary integration <\/strong>A state of integration entirely dependent\nonly on immediate conditions, and thus likely to be of short duration \u2013 e.g. a\nstate of inspiration or meditative absorption. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Total responsibility fallacy <\/strong>The absolutising assumption that we\nhave complete responsibility in a given context of judgement<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trust <\/strong>Faith (i.e. emotive dimension of belief) in relation to\npersons<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Truth on the edge<\/strong> The regulative idea of an ultimate state of\naffairs, which is meaningful but cannot be the object of justified assertions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Value foundations<\/strong> (from Haidt) Types of shared value (whether\nexperiential or absolutised) applied to politics<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zero responsibility fallacy <\/strong>The absolutising assumption that we\nhave no responsibility in a given context of judgement\n\n\n\n\n\n0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The following brief glossary of key terms is provided as a ready reference, for anyone who needs a reminder during reading of some of my distinctive uses of terminology. The glossary here consolidates those in all four volumes. Any frequently used terms not in it can reasonably be assumed to follow a standard English dictionary […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":382,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_oct_exclude_from_cache":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-551","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/551"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=551"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/551\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":556,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/551\/revisions\/556"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/382"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=551"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}