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Introduction<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The\ntitle of this book might suggest a rant by a disillusioned ex-Buddhist: but\nthis is not the intention. Although I am no longer personally committed to the\nBuddhist tradition, I am still committed to practising its central insights. I\nwant to use those insights to try to separate the wheat from the chaff in\ntraditional Buddhism. This is a critical book about Buddhism from a perspective\nwhich is still sympathetic to some of its central teachings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After\naround twenty years of engagement in Buddhism, I have reached the conclusion\nthat Buddhism has largely betrayed its own insights. On the other hand, those\ninsights are still there, and there is much that is valuable to be learned from\nBuddhism. Personally, I am no longer sure whether I should describe myself as a\n\u201cBuddhist\u201d or not, because it all depends whether this is taken to mean that I\nam committed to the core insights of the Middle Way (which I am) or to Buddhism as\na tradition (which I am not).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I\nam writing this book not just to try to get Buddhists to look more radically at\nthe defects in their own religion, but also to help both Buddhists and\nnon-Buddhists to differentiate those defects from what is valuable. We should\ncelebrate Buddhism\u2019s insights, whilst decrying their betrayal. My main emphasis\nis a critical one, because I want to get people to think again about things\nthey have taken for granted in Buddhism, but that doesn\u2019t mean the intention is\nnegative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There\nare many Westerners approaching Buddhism today and finding much that is\npositive there. On first encountering Buddhism myself, one of the first things\nthat I found impressive was the people. Sometimes years of practice can give\nBuddhist leaders an integrity, straightforwardness and trustworthiness that are\ncertainly far beyond anything I have met elsewhere. Another impressive feature\nis the thinking. Buddhism in the West is a young religion, and there is still\nlots of real thinking and experimentation going on. Far from settling into a\nniche and just defending their position, as religionists often do, Western\nBuddhists are often still debating what they should believe and how they should\nlive. For me this gives the Buddhist community a sense of openness and vitality\nthat is valuable. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buddhism\nfocuses on practice, on changing the individual for the better; unlike too many\nother religions which either focus solely on belief, or on performing rituals\nthat help to give a community its identity but have little further value. Many\nof its meditation practices are accessible to all, whether or not they think\nthemselves \u201cBuddhist\u201d, and many people in the West are benefiting from them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However,\nthese positive features are unfortunately accompanied by others that often stop\nnewcomers in their tracks, or confront them with quite reasonable doubts after\nonly a little while. Despite its emphasis on practicality, Buddhism is still\ntied to an Eastern tradition that interferes with that practical value. The\nopenness and practicality is obstructed by piles of dogma shipped in from Asian\ncultures. Many Buddhist teachings that at first appear plausible, when examined\nmore closely, turn out to be contradictory. These contradictions are often\nmistaken for mystical insights when they are nothing of the kind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buddhists\nsometimes criticise Christianity for its reliance on belief in God and the\nrevelations of the Bible. Yet Buddhist belief in the revelations of the Buddha\nfrom his enlightened state is often comparable in ways that many Buddhists seem\nunwilling to recognise. The strong tradition of faith in the guru also raises\nsimilar worries. Many schools of Buddhism maintain a tradition of monasticism\nthat separates Buddhists into first and second-class categories, whilst even\nthose Buddhists who have given up monasticism often maintain a sentimental\nattachment to the idea of it. Similarly, with karma and rebirth, even those\nBuddhists with apparently new interpretations of these traditional doctrines\noften turn out to have a strong sentimental attachment to them. Above all, much\nBuddhism turns out to be obsessed with an ideal of nirvana that is celebrated\nfor its own sake, at the expense of the spiritual progression within ordinary experience\nthat most commonly attracts people to Buddhist practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

None\nof these kinds of worries would matter so much if Buddhists did not go so much\nout of their way to appear reasonable on the surface, thus creating a deceptive\nimpression. In fact, their most vital, important, and insightful teachings\noften serve to lure people into Buddhism so that they then feel subsequently\ndriven to swallow the dogmatic, traditional and unreasonable bits of Buddhism for\nfear of losing the good bits. Some teachings, like that of the ultimate\nemptiness of all phenomena in Mahayana Buddhism, seem to serve primarily to\nreassure the critical parts of Buddhist brains and make them feel their doubts\nhave been addressed, when they have not at all. A general reassurance that\neverything is empty, endlessly repeated in scripture and ritual, does not get\nus anywhere in coming to terms with this fact and actually seeing its\nimplications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\nbecoming an ordained Buddhist, a member of the Western Buddhist Order, my\nexperience was that I was obliged to either take Buddhism or leave it. Either\none accepted the unhelpful bits of Buddhism with the helpful, or one did not\nget the benefit of the helpful. I did not want to lose the beneficial aspects\nof Buddhism, so I took ordination. Three years later, I realised that this had\nbeen a mistake: I had compromised my intellectual integrity by committing\nmyself to Buddhist tradition, in a way that was in fact undermining my\nrelationship to truth, and thus in the long run even undermining my ability to\nengage with the helpful practices of Buddhism. So I resigned from the Western\nBuddhist Order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\nshould not be necessary for people like me in the West to face this dilemma.\nAll that Buddhism needs to do is to reform itself in accordance with its core\ninsights, and be ready to discard much of the other stuff that has been\ndeposited on those insights to obscure them over the centuries. For Western\nBuddhists this would be relatively easy to do, for the tradition in the West\nhas scarcely put down roots yet and could easily be shaped anew. It does not\nneed to completely abandon doctrine, symbol and ritual, but it does need to\ngive them a much more thorough overhaul than has yet been undertaken, even by apparently\nradical reformers such as Sangharakshita or Ch\u00f6gyam Trungpa. If this could be\nachieved then Buddhism could become much more clearly a force for good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So\nwhat follows is an attempt to sort out what is useful in Buddhism from what is\nnot useful, as the basis of a plea for reform much more radical than anything\nthat has yet been attempted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A note on \u201cBuddhism\u201d<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Throughout\nthis book one of the central issues is likely to be the nature of what I am\ncriticising: what is Buddhism? Buddhists have become Buddhists for all kinds of\ndifferent personal motives, and many have arrived at their own interpretations\nof what \u201cBuddhism\u201d means. The concept, is, of course, contested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For\nmost academics writing about Buddhism, statements about Buddhism need to be\nbacked up by copious reference to scriptures, anthropological observations of\nBuddhist practice, or both. This approach, however, in no way leaves the idea\nof \u201cBuddhism\u201d any less contested; moreover the scriptures appealed to are often\nopen to multiple interpretations, and are interpreted in line with the\npreconceptions that have gained currency in the small world of academic\nBuddhist studies. Appeals to scripture tend to lead one in the direction of\ncomplex and often fruitless arguments that are largely about the history and\nculture in which the scriptures were written, or the conditions of their\nproduction, not about universal human concerns. I will say more about this\nissue in the last section of chapter 2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

My\napproach to \u201cBuddhism\u201d, to cut through this type of fruitless argument, will be\nsimply to make statements about it based on my own experience, and examine\ntheir consistency. This method is philosophical, and in philosophy one makes\nprogress, not by referring to sources of authority, but by investigating the\ngrounds, consistency and implications of beliefs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nexperience that is my starting point consists in about twenty years of\ninvolvement with the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (FWBO \u2013 recently\nrenamed the Triratna Buddhist Community) plus some wider academic study of\nBuddhism. I will try to give due recognition to the diversity of opinion as I\nunderstand it, and not merely represent Buddhism in its \u201cstraw man\u201d form of the\nmost conservative versions. If anything, my impression is that I have been\ninvolved in one of the more radical sections of the Buddhist world, and will\nprobably go further in accommodating some of the alternative approaches that\nare to be found in the FWBO than other more traditional Buddhists may find\nnecessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There\nwill be some limited discussion of scriptures where these are of particular\nimportance, but I do not see any need or use in the academic practice of\nreferencing all factual statements about Buddhism to a scripture. Rather this\npractice often distracts attention from the kinds of underlying problems I will\nbe trying to address in this book, and for many gives a misleading sense of\nreassurance of the grounds of belief. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Obviously,\nthe kind of Buddhism I will be addressing is a representative, broadly\nrecognised one. In the vast majority of cases, I expect that this will largely\nfit with the experience of (Western or Westernised) readers with any experience\nof Buddhism. If you have so far customised Buddhism that my picture it does not\nfit with your understanding of Buddhism, then I congratulate you on having\nalready done a lot of the kind of independent thinking I seek to stimulate in\nthis book. For many years, I have myself worked with such a \u201ccustomised\u201d\nBuddhism, but also found distinct drawbacks in attempting to maintain a version\nof \u201cBuddhism\u201d which had little to do with what most other people thought it\nwas. There comes a point where the strain of trying to hold such a position\nbecomes too great, and perhaps one has to let go of the long-nurtured label\n\u201cBuddhist\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\nmy experience, Buddhists often deny that criticisms of Buddhism are relevant to\nthe Buddhism they follow, because of their belief that the true Dharma is\nwordless, beyond mere descriptions, and certainly not to be encompassed by the\ncrudities of any description of \u201cBuddhism\u201d. The purpose of this book is not to\ntry to criticise any such true Dharma, if it exists. Instead, however, I would\nlike Buddhists to start taking responsibility for the ways in which Buddhism is\nactually commonly explained and described, before they take refuge in\nidealisations.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chapter 1: The four\nnoble principles<\/a><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The <\/a>Middle Way<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Expositions\nof Buddhism often start with the Four Noble Truths as the most basic teaching\nof Buddhism. That is one reason why I feel a need to address them from the\nbeginning. Yet I cannot take the Four Noble Truths as they are normally\npresented and build on those, for even here, at the very starting point of\nBuddhism, there are confusions to clear up. These confusions suggest to me that\nthe Buddhist betrayal of its own insights is no recent phenomenon, but started\nvery early on in its history or was perhaps even there in confusions from the\nbeginning. My main purpose, however, is not to try to trace the history of this\nbetrayal, but simply to ask whether core Buddhist teachings are coherent and\nconsistent, whether they make sense, and whether they are helpful in assisting\npeople in the modern world to improve their lives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before\nexamining the Four Noble Truths, I will need to establish an approach with\nwhich to examine them. The standard of judgement I will be applying is one\nwhich Buddhists often appeal to but which they apply incompletely: that of\npractical spiritual usefulness, of making people\u2019s lives better. This does not\nmean any attempt to reduce Buddhism to science, utilitarianism, postmodernism\nor any other modern Western doctrine, but to take the account of usefulness\npointed to by central Buddhist teachings themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nBuddhist teaching which is centrally concerned with usefulness is the Middle Way. We can\nassert this primarily through its role in the story of the life of the Buddha[1]<\/a>, a\nstory that is of great symbolic value. It matters little how far it is\nhistorically true, much more how well it represents a core Buddhist insight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Traditionally,\nthe Buddha is said to have been a prince with an over-protective father, who\nsheltered him in the isolation of a palace from any kind of suffering and tried\nto distract him from any religious goal by surrounding him with pleasures. He\nwas roused from the obsession with pleasure that this sequestered existence\nsymbolises through encounters with an old man, a sick man, a corpse, and a\nreligious mendicant. Perhaps a modern equivalent to this might be a modern\nadolescent, lost in a highly protected technological world of instant\ngratification, suddenly finding himself in a developing country and confronted\nfor the first time with the pains of common human experience as it has existed\ndown the ages. As a result the purpose of his life changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nBuddha-to-be then dramatically renounces his protected and hedonistic lifestyle\nfor the highly risky alternative of religious beggary. He leaves the palace and\ngoes forth into the forest to seek enlightenment. At first he does this under\nthe instruction of two different spiritual teachers, and then in company with a\ngroup of companions often known as the Five Ascetics. The Five Ascetics are\ntrying to gain enlightenment through imposing pain and hardship upon\nthemselves, in the belief that this can earn merit which they can subsequently\ncash out as enlightenment. The Buddha-to-be eventually realises, however, that\nthis ascetic approach, too, is not conducive to enlightenment, but merely\nweakens his body. He abandons it, to the disgust of his companions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nstory so far has a symmetry. The Buddha-to-be has tried a life of pleasure and\na life of pain, but neither approach has led to the enlightenment he sought. So\nhe tries what subsequently became known as the Middle Way, and by this method, according\nto the traditional story, achieved enlightenment. The question of enlightenment\nis something we will unavoidably have to return to later in this book, but for\nme the story starts to become much less interesting at this point. What the\nBuddha finally achieved is of much less interest than the method he used to\nmake progress towards it, because the method he used can be applied by anyone,\nanywhere, at any time, whereas there is nobody around who is verifiably\nenlightened. The story so far simply symbolises that method in a compelling\nnarrative, but after this it starts making claims about the Buddha and about a\nstate of nirvana which is both remote to us and in conception very much\nconditioned by Indian culture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\nmy experience, Buddhists often go little further than saying that the Buddha\nfollowed the Middle Way\nbetween asceticism and self-indulgence. \nThey might also discuss the Middle\n Way of beliefs which accompanies this: the Middle Way between\neternalism (often defined as belief in an eternal self) and nihilism or annihilationism\n(often defined as the belief that the soul is cut off at death), which is\nextensively discussed in the Pali canon. They identify eternalism with\nasceticism and self-indulgence with nihilism, and point to Buddhist teaching as\nlying between these extremes. But they rarely go on to explain much more than\nthis about the Middle Way,\nan incredibly rich teaching scandalously neglected by the religion that gave\nbirth to it.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet\nthe Middle Way,\nuniquely among central Buddhist teachings, is about how to generally go about\njudging the right way forward, rather than about some claimed state of affairs\nor about a more specific prescription for action. It is thus the only central\nBuddhist teaching which is completely universal, and which can be passed without\nreservation directly from the Buddha\u2019s ancient Indian context to a modern\nWestern context. We do not have to worry about whether it is true and relevant\ntoday, because what it offers us is a general approach for working out what\nbeliefs we should accept and what actions we should take in any context<\/em>. We simply have to try it out in our own context, in\na similar experimental fashion to the way in which the Buddha was said to have\ntried it out. In itself, it does not tell us to believe or to do anything, but\nif we make use of it, it will quite shortly make clear what we should believe\nand do in our context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\ndoes this basically by addressing conditions, not in a scientific way by\ncreating positive theories about what will happen, but the other way round, by\npointing out what approaches to conditions are likely to be mistaken and\nunhelpful. In a world that is constantly changing and always more complex than\nwe take it to be or can readily grasp, it is overall certainties about the\nworld or about how to act in it that are likely to be mistaken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If\nwe consider the religious, moral, and scientific certainties of the past \u2013 for\nexample that sacrifices to the gods kept the world in order, that slavery is\nacceptable because master and slave classes are part of the world\u2019s design, or\nthat the earth is at the centre of the universe \u2013 it seems clear that what may\nseem obvious at one time or place is not at another, and the less closely these\ntheories could be checked through specific experiences, the more vulnerable\nthey were to eventually being superseded. Let\u2019s take the idea that sacrifices\nto the gods maintained order.  We can now\nsee that this is mistaken because we can now see other, more concrete, ways,\nthat we can experience more closely, which explain how the order of society can\nbe maintained: for example, education, democracy, international institutions,\nand the police. Similarly, slavery is no longer acceptable because we can see\nthat those who used to be slaves are in fact human beings with the same kinds\nof capabilities as those who used to be their masters, so that the\njustifications for giving them inferior status were mistaken. Both sacrifices\nand slavery were justified by metaphysical<\/em>\nbeliefs, i.e. beliefs that cannot even potentially be checked through\nexperience of any kind. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\nis dogmatic metaphysical claims of this kind that are unhelpful, because they\nlead us to make claims which stop us looking more carefully at people and\nevents and becoming more closely aware of what they are actually like. In\nfinding the Middle Way,\nthe Buddha navigated between two types of metaphysical claim that were dominant\nin his time. One was the idea that there was an order in the universe that\nwould ensure that every pain inflicted would be compensated in the future by\npleasure hereafter, which we would continue to experience in an eternal\nexistence (eternalism). The other was that we do not know of, or at least can\nsafely ignore, any such order, and will cease to exist after death anyway, so\nwe should just fall in with the values of those around us and get pleasure\nwhere we can (nihilism). It is by navigating between these extremes that he\nmanaged to engage with the conditions in his own life that were holding back\nhis spiritual progression. The Middle\n Way helped him engage with the conditions created\nby the craving, hatred and ignorance of his own mind, which he could only\naddress by combining disciplined strength of resolve with care for himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\nwas through following this Middle\n Way in his context that the Buddha managed to not\nonly get closer to discovering the truth about himself and the world, but also\nfind the values that would subsequently motivate him. To make this procedure\nuniversal, one should navigate between the metaphysical dogmas of one\u2019s own time and place<\/em>, and thus\nattempt to engage with one\u2019s own conditions more closely, rather than assuming\nthat one\u2019s navigation will be in any other respects similar to the\nBuddha\u2019s.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before\nsaying much more about this, however, we will first need to backtrack to say\nmore about what are more generally considered to be the basic principles of\nBuddhism. I shall consider these in the light of the Middle Way as the most\nuniversal method, and try to assess whether these principles are indeed\nconsistent with the Middle Way or not. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The three marks of\nconditioned existence<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Many\naccounts of Buddhism start with the three lakshanas<\/em>,\nor three marks (or characteristics) of conditioned existence: dukkha\n(unsatisfactoriness), anicca (impermanence) and anatta (insubstantiality).\nThese are said to give a basic Buddhist analysis of the nature of phenomenal\nexistence, and together form the First Noble Truth, at the root of Buddhist\nteaching[2]<\/a>.\nThey are also a good place to start in distinguishing the core principles of\nBuddhism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dukkha <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nfirst mark of conditioned existence is dukkha<\/em>.\nThis has long been mistranslated as \u201csuffering\u201d, even by Buddhists themselves,\nbut it refers not just to the experience of pain or suffering as such, but also\nto the experience of loss or mortification when we do not experience an\nexpected pleasure, and to a more general sense of meaninglessness (sankhara-dukkha<\/em>). What these doctrines\nhave in common is the idea of unsatisfactoriness<\/em>,\ni.e. the idea that our experience does not give us ultimate satisfaction,\nhowever promising it may appear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dukkha\nis a feature of conditioned existence<\/em>\nor samsara, which means that what is being claimed is not that the universe\nitself is dukkha, just that the phenomenal universe (the universe we\nexperience) is dukkha. But does this claim ring true? The whole of what I\nexperience will only be unsatisfactory if I compare it to a standard of\nsatisfaction that it fails to live up to, and clearly sometimes this happens.\nFor example, I want this book to be accepted by a publisher, and I shall be\ndisappointed and feel it to be unsatisfactory or frustrating if every publisher\nrejects it; but the reason for this is because I have a desire for the book to\nbe published, a model in my mind of what will happen which may be disappointed.\nIf I lacked this desire, however, I would feel no frustration, and would not\nexperience the world as frustrating.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\norder to maintain the belief that all phenomenal existence is dukkha<\/em>, Buddhists must insist that I can\nnever experience anything without this anticipation of satisfaction that is\nthen not satisfied; or that if I do have such experiences of being free from\ndukkha, then I must be enlightened. But how do they know this? How do they know\nthat everyone\u2019s experience is always<\/em>\nunsatisfactory? How do they even know that their own<\/em> experience is always unsatisfactory? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To\ntest any claim we need to look at possible counter-examples. In this case, I\ntry to imagine the most satisfying experience of my life to see whether I can\nmake sense of the belief that it is ultimately unsatisfactory. What springs to\nmind are, for example, meditational experiences, experiences of achievement on\ncompleting a project, or experiences of sexual or sensual satisfaction. When I\nexperienced all of these, was I somehow comparing them to a divine template, in\ncomparison with which these \u201csatisfying\u201d experiences were unsatisfactory? I\nthink not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To\ninsist that all these \u201csatisfying\u201d experiences must have been ultimately \u201cunsatisfactory\u201d\nnot only requires skating over the experience itself and imposing a dogmatic\nframework on it, but it also means assuming that we will never have a fully\nsatisfying experience in the future, short of enlightenment. As soon as we\ncease to trust our own experience of satisfaction at the point we have that\nexperience, dogma rears its head, because no matter what our experience might\nbe, it will make no difference to the belief that it is unsatisfactory. We will\nthen have no other standard by which to judge than the wholesale acceptance of\nthe dogma that all experience is unsatisfactory. The doctrine of dukkha\nrequires that everyone always has a perfect measure in mind beside which the\nworld seems imperfect. Buddhists have no way of knowing that this is the case,\nand thus must dogmatically assert it. But they do not need to do so. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nuseful insight to be found in the doctrine of dukkha has nothing to do with a\nclaim about the phenomenal universe, let alone the actual universe. It is\nsimply a claim that if<\/em> we hold up a\nstandard of perfect satisfaction as a basis of judging our experience (as we\noften, in fact, seem to do), we find that experience wanting. This means that\nif we want to stop experiencing dukkha, we should stop using this perfect\nmeasure. The principle is one about how we should<\/em>\nsee things, not how things are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This\npoint may be seen more clearly if we tried turning around the doctrine of\ndukkha and made it into a doctrine of sukha<\/em>,\nor happiness. Supposing we claimed that everything in the phenomenal universe,\nall our experiences, was in fact happy. They might seem unhappy sometimes, but\nthis is just because we are not using the right measure to judge what we\nexperience. If we used the correct standard of imperfection, indeed of general\ngrottiness in the universe, we would see that what we actually experience is\nalways better than this. Since this is the true standard to judge by, it might\nbe claimed, in fact the universe is much better than our expectations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This\ndoctrine of sukha<\/em> is neither more nor\nless implausible than the doctrine of dukkha<\/em>,\nLike dukkha, it says that if<\/em> we apply\na certain type of standard to our experience, that experience will be found\nwanting. What it doesn\u2019t do is show that we in fact always apply that standard,\nor even that we ought to. In practice, because our cravings often lead us to\nget attached to an idealisation of how things are going to be, dukkha is\nprobably much more common than sukha, and that is why the doctrine of dukkha\noffers a useful insight for many people: but it does not give a universal law\nany more than sukha<\/em> does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Superficial\ncritics of Buddhism often take the doctrine of dukkha to indicate pessimism,\nand Buddhists hasten to defend themselves against this charge by explaining\nthat dukkha<\/em> has a positive purpose.\nIt does indeed have a positive purpose. If you don\u2019t identify a problem and\nacknowledge its existence, you cannot fix it, and dukkha provides a foundation\nfor the positive progress offered in the other Noble Truths. However, this\npositive purpose is not furthered by taking dukkha to be a truth about the\nphenomenal universe. It would be better served by giving dukkha as a practical\nprinciple about how we should respond to the suffering we experience, pointing\nout the drawbacks of allowing craving to determine our way of seeing it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So\nthe first element of the \u201cFirst Noble Truth\u201d is not a truth<\/em> at all. It does point to a useful insight, but one that has\nbeen misleadingly presented through the ages. Newcomers to Buddhism have to\nstruggle to beat their way through the obfuscation of its traditional\npresentation in order to get to the useful teaching, and things are made\nunnecessarily difficult for them from the very beginning. It appears that\nBuddhism wants to deny, or at least underemphasise, the degree of positive\nfulfilment we do actually get from our imperfect existence, but it does not\nneed to do this to make the underlying point. How many newcomers have been\nneedlessly put off by this presentation of the \u201ctruth\u201d at the beginning? Why\ndoes Buddhism continue to present itself in this misleading way? This is a\nquestion I will have many occasions to repeat in this book.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anicca<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Let\nus now look, a little more briefly, at the other two marks of conditioned\nexistence. Anicca<\/em>, the doctrine of\nimpermanence, is again often expressed in the form that all conditioned things\nare impermanent. We suffer, in part, because we take what is actually\nimpermanent to be permanent, not recognising its true nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once\nagain, though, when this is offered as a truth about conditioned existence we\nfind that whether it is true depends on your standpoint. When we stand looking\nat a river, are we seeing continual change because the waters flow by, or an\nabsence of change because the river is still there? Any experience over a given\nperiod of time will reveal some features that appear to change during that time\nand others which remain the same. Why should we focus on one of these features\nand not the other? To say that we should focus on change, not permanence,\nbecause the world is really<\/em> changing\nrather than really permanent, is just dogmatic. My experience itself is not\nnecessarily one of impermanence unless I judge it lacking by the measure of an\nabsolute permanence, but there is no way of proving that this is always the\nmeasure I really<\/em> apply, or really\nought to apply, when there are other possible ways of seeing it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For\nexample, let\u2019s take the case of bereavement. This is the classic case of\nimpermanence often mentioned by Buddhists. It is claimed that we assume people\nto be permanent: then, when they are taken away from us by death, we suffer\nbecause we are not adapted to the impermanence of the universe. No doubt this\nis sometimes, or even often, the case. But to say that it is always <\/em>the case is over-statement.\nBereavement is not always a question of being surprised by impermanence. For\nexample, in the case of my mother, who died recently from Alzheimer\u2019s, I did\nnot personally find it so. With an Alzheimer\u2019s patient, one is more likely to\ntake comfort from the fact that the semi-human state reached by an old person is\nimpermanent, and greet their death as a relief. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\npractice, though, what actually proves insightful about the doctrine of\nimpermanence is that quite often people do seem to have an assumption of\nsomething being permanent when it is not. For example, people are disappointed\nwhen childhood haunts have changed, or fail to take into account the effect of\nageing on their marriage. Once more, the doctrine is much more useful, and\naccurate, when not taken as an insight into how things actually are, but rather\nas practical guidance into how we ought to avoid seeing them in certain common\ncircumstances. Buddhists, though, are their own worst enemies in presenting a\nconfusing version of their doctrine that claims much more than it practically\nneeds to. It is not the case that all conditioned existence is impermanent,\nonly that we may <\/em>suffer if we are\nattached to a permanent idea of something that is impermanent. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As\nwith the doctrine of dukkha, one could also just as easily turn this around the\nother way. What if, instead of a doctrine of impermanence, we had a doctrine of\npermanence? We think things are constantly changing, and we suffer when they\ndon\u2019t but actually stay the same. For example, this would fit the experience of\nfrustration of those trying to make progressive reforms in an atmosphere of\nstifling conservative bureaucracy. The doctrine of permanence, again, would not\nbe essentially more or less true than the doctrine of impermanence. Again, it\nwould be true to some experience, but misleading when dogmatically applied as a\nmetaphysical claim about all experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anatta<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally,\nthere is anatta, often poorly translated as \u201cnot-self\u201d, but better rendered as\n\u201cinsubstantiality\u201d, or even \u201clack of ultimate substantiality\u201d. Anatta basically\npoints out that when we believe there is a definite object, or a definite self,\ncorresponding to a certain label, then we are mistaken. For example, the\n\u201cchair\u201d I believe I am sitting on is just a convenient way of referring to a\nset of processes and experiences, but it is my mind that has imposed on it the\nidea of a \u201cchair\u201d as a defined unchanging object with clear boundaries.\nSimilarly with myself, I tend to believe that there is a fixed thing I call me,\nwhen what I actually experience is a set of changing mental and physical states\nto which I attach that label. Such labels are part of the process of\nattachment, as I can only be attached to (or reject) something I have thus\nconceptually parcelled up. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There\nare strong philosophical arguments that support this basic insight in the\nBuddhist tradition. The labelling of either an object or a self will vary in\ndifferent circumstances, given different cultures, languages, and individual\nexperiences. For example, a person from a culture that had never encountered\nWestern technology would not see a computer as an identifiable object as we\nwould. A piece of polystyrene could be a toy for a child, non-biodegradable\nrubbish for another person, packaging for a warehouse-man, or potential\nmodelling material for someone else. These variations suggest that it is not\nthe object itself, but our way of labelling it, which gives it its identity.\nSimilarly with the boundaries of an object: do I see a car as a set of parts,\nas an individual object, or part of the traffic? Do I consider my hair and\ntoenails part of me? The boundaries are set by us. When objects or selves start\nand stop in time also depends on us: when does a foetus become a person? When\ndoes grass in the stomach of a rabbit cease to become grass and start to become\nrabbit?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However,\nthese arguments only support the insight that the labelling of objects comes\nfrom our minds, not that there are ultimately no objects. We simply do not know\nwhether there are objects in the world out there, because we only ever perceive\nthem through the filter of our experiences. It makes sense, in some ways, to\nbelieve that there are trees and rabbits and boxes and computers, and indeed\npeople. However, if they exist, these things are constantly changing, the\nlabels placed on them may vary, and their boundaries are shifting. Buddhists\ntend to explain this in terms of objects existing conventionally<\/em> but not ultimately[3]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>.\nAnatta, then, claims that objects do not ultimately exist, at least in the\nforms we experience and label them. More philosophically careful Buddhists may\nalso add that anatta means objects do not not<\/em>\nexist: that is, we do not know ultimately that they do not exist any more than\nwe know that they do exist. All we know is that our conceptions of them are\nlikely to be limited and mistaken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once\nagain, then, we have what first appeared to be a metaphysical claim, about\nobjects existing or not existing, but on closer examination the doctrine of\nanatta (unless crudely expressed or misinterpreted) makes no such claims. It\nonly requires us to bear in mind the limitations of our knowledge. It is\nintended to leave us in a state of open-minded doubt about objects around us,\nnot a dogmatic assumption that they do not exist. This doctrine becomes of\ngreat practical value when it reminds one to reconsider the conceptions that\nhave become the focus of a strong emotional response, such as hatred. I may be\ncarrying round and constantly reviewing a mental image of the person I hate as\nhaving a certain character that led them to do or say certain things against\nme. However, a re-examination of this idea in the light of anatta might lead me\nto reflect that they also probably have many other more positive\ncharacteristics unknown to me, and it is an idea that I hate rather than a\nperson.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If\nwe separate it from a metaphysical claim, anatta becomes inseparable from the Middle Way. If the Middle Way is a\nprinciple of judgement which involves avoiding the dogmatic extremes of\neternalism and nihilism, anatta just gives us a further reminder of the\nlimitations of any of these dogmatic views.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where\nanatta can be interpreted unhelpfully is where it is seen just as an insight of\nthe state of enlightenment, which is then at such a distance from our\nexperience that we fall back on purely conventional categories. If anatta makes\nno difference to our lives now, we are not taking its insights seriously\nenough. If we use it as a reminder of the limitations of our understanding of\nreality, we can use it to reflect on anything in our experience, and make\ngradual adjustments so as to make our understanding of that thing better by\nquestioning what we have previously assumed about it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There\nis a strong tendency in the Buddhist tradition, however, not to use anatta to\nquestion common assumptions at all, but rather just as a way of idealising\nenlightened experience, which allegedly sees things as they really are beyond\nconcepts. We may reflect that we do not understand things as they really are,\nbut, instead of then investigating them for ourselves, then take this as a\nreason for depending on an enlightened person\u2019s account of them. This approach can\noften have the effect just of reinforcing a new conventional view, which has\ngrown up around a tradition of what may once have been one (allegedly\nenlightened) person\u2019s insight. Rather than being a tool to gradually rid us of\nillusions, anatta then shuts us into them more firmly. This, of course, raises\nmany questions about enlightenment and authority in Buddhism, which we will\nreturn to later (in the next chapter).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The three lakshanas in general<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For\ndukkha, anicca, and anatta, then, we have found a common pattern. All are based\non insights that can be of practical value. However, all three doctrines are\ncommonly presented as metaphysical beliefs, rather than as principles of\njudgement in relation to our own experience. The presentation of the three\nlakshanas as metaphysical beliefs is responsible for a great deal of\nmisunderstanding of Buddhism by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Those who see\nBuddhism as a negative and pessimistic religion are not always wrong, as\npessimism is a type of dogmatism (insisting inflexibly that things are always\nworse than experience gives us grounds to believe), and such dogmatism is often\nencouraged by the way Buddhists present these doctrines. On the other hand, the\nneed to avoid denying the hollowness or lack of satisfaction we often\nexperience, the need to appreciate the impermanence of things we are attached\nto, and the need to appreciate the way in which we impose categories on our\nexperience are all vital starting points for the spiritual life.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> There\nare many sources for the details of the Buddha\u2019s biography in the Buddhist\ntradition. In the Pali Canon, the Ariyapariyesana\nSutta<\/em> (Sutta 26, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, trans.\n\u00d1anamoli and Bodhi, Wisdom 1995) gives important early elements of the story.\nIt is more fully elaborated in the Buddhacarita<\/em>\nof  Ashvaghosha (ed. And trans.\nE.H.Johnston, Motilal Banarsidass 1972)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> For example, see Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught<\/em> (Wisdom 1990), or Sangharakshita A Guide to the Buddhist Path (Windhorse 1990) p.177<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> As in the \u201ctwo truths\u201d philosophy of Nagarjuna (e.g. for an introduction see Paul Williams Mahayana Buddhism<\/em> [Routledge 1989] p.69)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Go to main page for this book<\/a><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Introduction The title of this book might suggest a rant by a disillusioned ex-Buddhist: but this is not the intention. Although I am no longer personally committed to the Buddhist tradition, I am still committed to practising its central insights. I want to use those insights to try to separate the wheat from the chaff […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":388,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_oct_exclude_from_cache":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-442","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/442"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=442"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/442\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":443,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/442\/revisions\/443"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/388"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=442"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}