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From Chapter 1: What is Buddhist Ethics?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The need for ethics<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Ethics, or\nmorality, is the way in which we judge our actions. If we consider any action\n\u201cright\u201d or \u201cwrong\u201d we are making a moral judgement. If I make a decision to buy\nfairtrade coffee, or if I disapprove of President George Bush\u2019s decision to\ninvade Iraq, in either case my judgement is a moral one. If I think it is\n\u201cgood\u201d to meditate regularly, or \u201cunskilful\u201d (when married) to have sex with\nsomeone other than my wife, I am making moral judgements. I do not have to\nthink of these as moral judgements for them to be so, and whether I recognise\nit or not I am making moral judgements constantly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We live in an\nage of great confusion about ethics. The modern philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre[1]<\/a>\nhas suggested that this confusion is rather as if we once knew what ethics\nreally were about, but now we have been handed down bits of moral language\nwhich we continue to use, but do not really understand. At one and the same time\nwe think of morality as being absolute, telling us what is right or wrong in\nsome final way applicable to everyone, but also as relative, only reflecting\nour own opinions. People regularly seem to say things like \u201cI don\u2019t want to\nmake a moral judgement\u201d (as though to do so would be offensive in some way) but\nthen proceed to make one. We have moral instincts, perhaps, but, if we can\u2019t\njust appeal to God to back them up any more, we can\u2019t see how to back up those\ninstincts with any kind of rational justification which would be more than a\npersonal \u201cbelief\u201d or opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This confusion\nseems to be a result of a loss of faith in traditional sources of ethics in the\nWestern world. We cannot merely accept what our parents and grandparents tell\nus is right, nor accept that God\u2019s absolute word has been revealed in the Bible\nor the Qur\u2019an. Those who do continue to follow the traditional instructions\noften seem to do so in a blinkered, narrowed way that tries to block out\nawareness of anything that might threaten their certainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The attempts\nmade by philosophers to address this situation may have helped to clarify it a\nlittle, but they have not provided us with an alternative source of ethics.\nThey seem to end up either trying to provide new reasons to support the old\nethics, or reinforcing our sense of having lost the ground beneath our feet. So\nethics continue to haunt us, like a ghost from another age that will not go\naway. But what a ghost! One that has an influence over every area of our lives,\nand one that is vital to the whole direction of the human race.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Into this\nsituation steps Buddhism, newly arrived in the Western world. In my view\nBuddhism brings with it one key idea that can help to resolve this problematic\nsituation: the Buddha\u2019s Middle Way. Perhaps the Middle Way could have been\nfound in other ways (and perhaps it has), since it is a universal principle\navailable anywhere at any time, but the Buddha and the Buddhist tradition give\na particularly clear expression to this principle, even if they have also\nconfused it or forgotten it at times. In this Middle Way, we are certainly\noffered an ethics, but not one based on old certainties of any kind. Rather we\nare challenged by the ideal of human enlightenment to shape our lives\npositively, whilst constantly remaining aware of the doubts, which lead us to\npursue this ideal with humility. If we can hold the positive and the negative,\nthe constructive and the sceptical, in creative tension like this, a wholly new\nview of ethics emerges. In this view of ethics the justification for \u201cright\u201d\nis gradually found in our own experience through the unification of our\nconstructive and sceptical energies<\/em>,\ngiving us a capacity for judgement increasingly adequate to the conditions we\nencounter. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this book I\nwant to put forward the idea that Buddhism offers a completely new view of\nethics which has the potential to creatively transform ethics in the West. I\nwant to show this primarily in a very practical way, by applying central\nBuddhist insights to moral issues. However, before I get onto this, I will need\nto give some more general explanation of my overall approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is \u201cBuddhist\u201d ethics?<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

We live in a\ntime when there is great debate in the West over the meaning of \u201cBuddhism\u201d. A\nvariety of traditional Buddhist schools that have been imported into the West\neach tend to see their own form of Buddhism as the true form. This does not\nmean that they deny that other Buddhist groups are Buddhists, but they are\nlikely to understand what \u201cBuddhist\u201d means in their own terms. So, for example,\nfor a Zen practitioner, \u201cBuddhist ethics\u201d primarily means how we should behave\naccording to traditional Zen teachings. These ethics are normative<\/em>, that\nis, they offer a way of judging good and bad, right and wrong. However, the\nteachings of different schools also conflict with each other at least to some\nextent. An example of a modern book that takes this approach is Hammalawa\nSaddhatissa\u2019s book Buddhist Ethics[2]<\/a>.\nThis actually offers a Theravadin view of Buddhist ethics, based on the\nparticular interpretation of Buddhist tradition found in that school.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From another\npoint of view, academic scholars of Buddhism tend to think of \u201cBuddhist ethics\u201d\nas what Buddhists in fact <\/em>believe and do. If you suggest that such and\nsuch an approach is \u201cright\u201d in Buddhism, they will challenge you to provide\nevidence that Buddhists in general actually tend to see it that way, or that\ntheir authorities (scriptures and teachers) tend to see it that way. This is descriptive\nethics<\/em>, because the scholars concerned are attempting to merely describe,\nwith a scientific detachment, what people believe in Buddhism. They do not\nnecessarily believe themselves that the ethics they describe actually are<\/em>\nright or wrong. An example of this approach is found in An Introduction to\nBuddhist Ethics by Peter Harvey[3]<\/a>,\nthe only real textbook for students available so far on the subject of Buddhist\nethics. The ethics he offers are entirely descriptive. One could characterise\nthis as the \u201cWhat people do in Thailand\u201d approach to Buddhist Ethics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both of these\napproaches to Buddhist Ethics seem unsatisfactorily narrow to me. In the search\nfor right and wrong, good and bad we are unavoidably seeking the universal,\nwhat is right or wrong, good or bad for everybody<\/em>. We are most unlikely\nto succeed in coming up with a specific set of rules<\/em> that define what is\ngood for everybody, but we should at least try to identify broad principles and\napproaches that lead us in the direction of universal right. The Middle Way\ntaught by the Buddha demands that on the one hand we recognise our ignorance,\nour limitations, and the fact that we will never get it quite right, but on the\nother that we should never abandon the quest for universal truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In these\ncircumstances we cannot possibly simply adopt the teachings of one Buddhist\nschool or tradition, which is most unlikely to have discovered the complete\ntruth, even if it is rich in glimpses of it. Traditional schools also all\ncompete with each other, with no reason to choose between them other than the\ntraditional authority each claims in its own region. So, although we need a\nnormative ethics, we cannot just adopt a traditional form of normative ethics.\nWe also cannot adopt a descriptive ethics, which just gives up on the question\nof what is actually right. A Westerner will get about as much guidance on how\nto live from academic books on Buddhist ethics as from reading a\nrandomly-selected train timetable: in either case you just get facts, which in\ncertain circumstances may be relevant to your life, but in most cases are not.\nWhat people do in Thailand is actually quite interesting, but there is no\nparticular reason why I should act as they do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, there\nis a third way of approaching Buddhist ethics which has been developed to some\nextent in the West, even though it is still in its infancy and suffers the\nhostility of both the traditional Buddhists and the academics. This is to\nattempt to identify basic principles of Buddhism that are universal, and to\napply these in all the circumstances of modern life. Any attempt to identify\nthe universal must also be provisional and arguable, so it should also invite\nargument. Sangharakshita (the founder of the Western Buddhist Order, now called\nthe Triratna Buddhist Order) has pioneered this approach in the West, and his Ten\nPillars of Buddhism[4]<\/a>\nis the best book I know on Buddhist ethics: but it is an interpretation of the\nTen Root Precepts and a discussion of their value rather than of the still more\nbasic principles which these precepts give practical training in applying.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this book I\nwish to follow in the footsteps of Sangharakshita in the sense of clarifying,\ndeveloping and applying some of the important work he started, but also give a\nrather different emphasis in discussing ethics. I would like to offer an\naccount of how Buddhists can go about ethical thinking in a way which is true\nto the most basic principles of the Buddha\u2019s dharma, without being bogged down\nby the many different subsequent interpretations of that teaching which have\noccurred in other times and places. These principles should be so universal\nthat they do not depend on the appeal to any authorities in the Buddhist\ntradition, and they become self-ratifying when tested through practice and\nexperience. I would like to explain these principles in a relatively brief and\naccessible way, and then apply them to the issues that we actually find in our\nlives today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, I make no\napology for writing a book on Buddhist ethics that has little to say about what\nsome will consider the fundamentals of the subject. I will have very little to\nsay on karma and rebirth, very little about the monastic rules, and relatively\nlittle to say (compared to what might be expected) even on the precepts. None\nof these necessarily always capture the distinctive and universal basis of\nbalanced moral judgement in Buddhism, because they have grown up as expressions\nof ethics in particular contexts, not as universal principles of moral\njustification. Karma and rebirth is a large issue which I will not attempt to\ndo justice to in this book[5]<\/a>,\nbut it will suffice to say here that I think it a product of the Buddha\u2019s\nspecific cultural background, and irrelevant to resolving moral issues. The\nMonastic Rules were developed for the very specific circumstances of monastic\nlife, and were never intended to be universal. The precepts, whilst universal\nin scope, are training principles, useful tools to help one practise Buddhist\nEthics, but they are a summarised reminder of that ethics, not themselves a justification <\/em>for one moral course being\nright or another wrong. To simply say that, for example, violence is wrong in\nBuddhism because the first precept forbids it, tells us nothing either about\nwhy it is forbidden, nor how the precept should be interpreted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nor will the\nquotations or references from the Pali Canon or other scriptures, which litter\nmost books on Buddhism, be found here. This is not because inspiring and\nhelpful approaches to ethics cannot be found in these scriptures: they can.\nHowever, I do not believe that the reasons we should follow Buddhist ethics are\ndemonstrated by appealing to the authority of scriptures. Rather they are shown\npractically through interpreting and applying central principles and seeing\ntheir effects on our lives. The interpretation of scriptures in their remote historical\nand cultural context and their application to modern life can also be a massive\ndistraction, a distraction that takes us away from the more urgent and\nimportant task of interpreting and applying core Buddhist principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead of\nrelying on these old crutches of Buddhist Ethics, I have attempted to think\nthrough each issue from the beginning using the Middle Way as a guide, since\nthe purpose of Buddhism is to address the conditions in our lives, not to\nsatisfy traditional expectations. I will be explaining later in this chapter\nhow the Middle Way can fulfil this purpose when other more traditional Buddhist\ncategories do not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whenever anyone\nwrites about normative ethics, it is no more than theory: but some theories are\nmore convincing and more potentially useful than others. I do not claim to have\ngot it all right, but I do believe that I am asking the right questions in the\nrest of this book, and am at least not saddled with many of the dogmatic\nassumptions with which many other writers seem to approach this subject. In\nparticular, I believe it is important to recognise the distinctive<\/em> nature of Buddhist ethics and not just (either\nconsciously or unwittingly) think of it in a framework derived from other\napproaches to ethics, whether these are Christian, utilitarian, Aristotelian,\nKantian, postmodernist or whatever. This does not mean that comparisons with\nthese other ways of thinking are not valuable, but it does mean that Buddhist\nethics should be understood in its own terms and not either consciously or\nunwittingly subsumed into other categories. Curiously enough, in my experience\nit is those writers on Buddhism who rely most on constant scholarly appeals to\nthe Buddhist tradition, and do not examine their basic assumptions, which tend\nto have more of such non-Buddhist assumptions lurking in the background, and\ntend to miss the important practical insights that Buddhism has to offer. The\nreasons for this should become clearer as we go on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ethics in the broad and narrow senses<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

So, what is\nBuddhist ethics, more positively? Well, there are really two levels at which\none can think about ethics in a Buddhist way. Here I will introduce a useful\npair of terms coined by Sangharakshita. He talked about \u201cethics in the broad\nsense\u201d and \u201cethics in the narrow sense\u201d[6]<\/a>.\nEthics in the broad sense is nothing other than the whole Buddhist Path: how we\nshould live according to Buddhist ethics is following the path of morality,\nmeditation and wisdom. This covers every aspect of our lives, including our\nways of thinking, our beliefs, and our habitual mental states as well as our\nbehaviour. Ethics in the narrow sense focuses only on our behaviour and ways in\nwhich we should control it directly. So, to take a simple example, it is\n(probably) right that I should meditate regularly; it is according to Buddhist\nethics in the broad sense<\/em>. It is also wrong that I should shoot cats\nthat come into my back garden for sport, which means that according to Buddhist\nethics I should refrain from this kind of behaviour. Shooting cats is wrong in\nthe narrow sense as well as in the broad sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is not\nalways clear where the boundaries lie between the broad and narrow senses, but\nthis doesn\u2019t matter. The important point is that Buddhism does recognise ethics\nin the broad sense as well as in the narrow sense. What we ought to do is not\njust \u201cmorality\u201d as people often think of it: not just<\/em> about whether to\nbe nice to my neighbours or whether or not it would be right to have an\nabortion. Morality in this narrow sense is certainly part of morality more\ngenerally, but every single action or decision I make about anything<\/em> is\nalso ethical. If I decide whether to brush my teeth, if I try to make another\neffort to return to the object of meditation, if I choose a book off the\nbookshelf: all of these are moral acts in the broad sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is one\npoint where, to begin with, Buddhism seems to have a much wider vision than\nmost Western philosophy. Many Western philosophers would follow the\neighteenth-century thinker Kant in assuming that, whilst there are some kinds\nof actions that can be moral or immoral, there are also others that are morally\nneutral, where it is not relevant to talk about morality. But one of the\nstarting points of Buddhism is the complete inter-connectedness of all\nphenomena. Nothing is entirely separate; nothing can be rigidly distinguished\nfrom anything else. It is our minds that impose such distinctions on our\nexperience. Although we must use some distinctions, we must always do so with\nan eye to the effects of doing so. So, if we are trying to overcome the\nlimitations of our minds and their delusions, we should try to recognise that\nthere are no such things as morally neutral acts, only acts that are of relatively\nmore or less moral significance<\/em>. Yes, it does matter more whether I start\nWorld War 3 than whether I brush my teeth, but that doesn\u2019t stop both of these\nbeing moral matters. We are never let off the hook, and there are no moral\nholidays.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this book I\nshall be concentrating almost entirely on ethics in the broad sense. Although\n\u201cethics in the narrow sense\u201d describes how people often see ethics and\ndescribes one way in which the Buddhist tradition speaks of it, it is ethics in\nthe broad sense that really deals with how we should live. I cannot resolve\nquestions about ethics in the narrow sense without considering ethics in the\nbroad sense. However, at the same time this does not mean that I am describing\nthe entire Buddhist path, because in this book I will be focussing on areas of\nmoral discussion. In the Buddhist Threefold Path there are two other major\naspects of human development, which fall under the headings of \u201cmeditation\u201d and\n\u201cwisdom\u201d, alongside \u201cethics\u201d. Though meditation and wisdom will not be excluded\nhere where they are inextricable from ethics, I am not attempting to do justice\nto them in the same way that I will be attempting to do justice to ethics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\ninextricable relationship between ethics and the rest of the Path is also one\nreason why we can never make absolutely valid moral rules. Every decision about\nhow to behave also depends on beliefs and states of mind. Supposing I was\nwondering whether to lie to my aunt when she asks me if I liked the horrible\nsocks she gave me for my birthday. Well, if I lie this has the virtue of being\nkind, whilst if I tell the truth it has the virtue of honesty and might stop\nher giving me horrible socks in future. What the right course of action would\nbe depends on my state of mind and beliefs as well as my aunt\u2019s. How offended\nis she going to be? Will she actually benefit from honesty? Am I too much in\nthe habit of being either brutally honest or timidly kind? I really cannot\nresolve this one without thinking in a much broader way about ethics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Starting Point: the Middle Way<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

At this point a\ncommon reaction is to give up, assuming that we could never really know what\u2019s\nright if we really try to take everything into account. It\u2019s too complicated!\nThe temptation is simply to fall back on some simple moral rules which some\nauthority figure has given us, or give up on there being any real right action\nat all. But this would be the easy way out. If we really want to help the\nworld, and help ourselves, we have to face up to how complex things really are.\nThere are no simple yes or no answers. This is the starting point of the Middle\nWay, which I take to be the most fundamental principle of Buddhism: we must\nstay in that complex, unclear middle ground and avoid premature judgements.\nThough there\u2019s another over-simple answer to avoid even in this, that we should\nnever<\/em> make judgements! Judgements are still necessary but should be\nbased on as much clarity, patience and understanding as we can reasonably\nmanage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, let\u2019s try\nto understand how we can go about doing ethics in the broad sense. How can we\nreally deal with all this complexity? Well, if we are to deal with a very\ncomplex, inter-related reality as far as we can, we need to understand the\ntruth as far as we can. Our understanding of the truth depends on many factors\nsuch as awareness, openness, wisdom, reflectiveness, and decisiveness, so we\ncan try to cultivate these through meditation, study and reflection. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Our progress\nwith these will vary, but there is one thing we can all do from the start to\navoid handicapping ourselves unnecessarily in our brush with reality: we can\navoid dogmatic assumptions or prejudices which make us constantly interpret the\nworld in certain skewed ways. So, the first step towards doing ethics in a\nbroad sense, taking into account all the conditions, is to avoid dogmatic\nbeliefs<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A simple\nexample of this which everyone will be familiar with might be racism. Supposing\nI have a neighbour who is (to take a nationality at random) Turkish, and my\nmoral issues are about how to treat him. Now, there are obviously many better\nand worse ways to relate to him, but a good starting point is to avoid racial\nprejudice. If I approach all my interactions with him with the idea that he\u2019s a\nTurk and Turks are somehow inferior to my own race, then I will not get to\ngrips at all with what he\u2019s really like. What he\u2019s really like may be anything\nfrom a saint to a mass-murderer, but I will never find out if all I think when\nI see him is \u201cTurk\u201d. It may be right to treat him in any of a variety of ways,\nbut I will never determine what these are at all if I don\u2019t start to see him as\na complex human being rather than just a \u201cTurk\u201d to begin with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is an\nobvious point to most reasonably civilised people in the modern world. However,\nthe same point applies more subtly in lots of other areas. My dogmatic belief\nmay not be a positive one, but a negative one. Here are some examples of\npositive and negative dogmatic beliefs:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThere\u2019s no\nsuch thing as morality\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe world was\ncreated by God\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cI\u2019m free to do\nwhat I like\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe are reborn\nafter death, so I can aim for a better rebirth\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThere are many\n\u2018truths\u2019 and therefore no truth\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What makes\nthese statements dogmatic is not the fact that no evidence is given for them.\nIt is impractical, and sometimes counter-productive, to try to back up\neverything we say with evidence (and of course the statements are also taken\nout of context). No, what makes them dogmatic is the fact that there could<\/em>\nnever be any evidence to back them up. Any reasons you could give to support\nthem could just as easily be interpreted the other way, as any student of\nphilosophy knows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To give an example\nfrom the Buddhist tradition, there are many pieces of evidence which have been\nput forward to support belief in rebirth, (such as the inexplicable memories of\ninfant prodigies[7]<\/a>), but\nall of these can be interpreted in other ways too, (such as that there are\nimpersonal stray strands of consciousness floating around which are sometimes\npicked up by children). To insist on one kind of explanation when there are\nequally probable alternatives is to make a metaphysical<\/em> claim which is\nnot a response to that evidence, but rather is an absolute and prior assumption\nwhich you would stick to whatever the evidence, fitting the evidence to the\nassumption rather than the other way around. It is to act in some ways as a\ncritic of Galileo\u2019s did when Galileo first used his telescope to observe\nmountains and craters on the moon: since his observations went against the\naccepted Aristotelian belief that the moon must be a perfect sphere, the critic\ninsisted that there must be a transparent substance filling in all the gaps\nbetween the lunar mountains. Metaphysical claims tend to be accepted on faith,\nor because everyone else in your group or society accepts them. Since no one\ncan ever challenge these dogmatic assumptions, they become unquestionable\npositions even when they seem to be increasingly at odds with reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Buddha\u2019s\nMiddle Way is first and foremost a way of disencumbering ourselves of these\ndogmatic positions. In the Buddha\u2019s life we first of all see a young prince in\na palace surrounded by one kind of dogmatic assumption: the nihilistic<\/em>\nidea that there is no morality in our lives beyond seeking our own pleasure or\nfollowing the ways of people around us. He breaks out from this kind of\ndogmatic assumption, renouncing his restricted life as a prince in a quest for\nthe right path. However, then he runs into the opposite type of dogmatic\nassumption, that of the eternalists<\/em> with fixed ideas about the kind of\nbeliefs and practices they should follow to reach a state of absolute goodness\nor salvation. These are represented by the five ascetics, who practised\nausterities in order to achieve a greater reward in the end. In seeing the\nlimitations of this approach, too, the Buddha had to find a new way forward\nbeyond both these types of human illusion, so he adopted the Middle Way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Middle Way\nas the basic principle of Buddhist ethics, then, is strongly symbolised by the\nBuddha\u2019s life and the method he is said to have used to make progress towards\nenlightenment. It is not, however, dependent on the historical truth of the\nBuddha having ever actually lived such a life, or having ever actually gained\nenlightenment; for insisting on this (even though it may well be true) is\nlikely to lead to another sort of eternalist dogmatism. The Middle Way can\nnever be true because<\/em> of some article of faith, only because it works in\nhelping us to understand the causes of suffering and to overcome them. We only\nknow it to be true insofar as we have experienced this, and up to that point it\nis just theory (though potentially very useful theory). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, to practice\nthe Middle Way in relation to a moral problem, we first need to become aware of\nthe two extremes of illusory belief we might fall into in relation to it, then\nfollow a path between them which seems to be most adequate to all the\nconditions at work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It would be\npossible to give a more detailed philosophical account of the Middle Way here:\nfor example, exploring the idea of \u201cevidence\u201d and the exact nature of\neternalism and nihilism. However, I have done this elsewhere[8]<\/a>\nand do not want to go into too much theoretical detail here. For everyday\npurposes it may be much better to think in terms of the symbolic power of the\nlife of the Buddha and to try to apply the central insight it represents to\nmoral issues.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> See After Virtue<\/em> Alasdair MacIntyre, pub. Duckworth, chapters 1 &2<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a>\nPublished by Wisdom Publications<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a>\nPublished by Cambridge University Press<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> The Ten Pillars of Buddhism<\/em> Sangharakshita, Windhorse Publications<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> See Robert M. Ellis A Theory of Moral Objectivity<\/em> p.447 onwards for discussion of this issue<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> See The\nTen Pillars of Buddhism Sangharakshita, Windhorse Publications<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> For a good example of this see Lama Anagarika Govinda The Way of the White Clouds<\/em> pub. Rider, p.131-136<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> In my book (and Ph.D. thesis), A theory of moral objectivity, available as a book from www.lulu.com<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Chapter 5: Environmental issues<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Attitudes to \u201cNature\u201d<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Like all the\nother moral issues discussed so far, environmental issues affect us constantly\nin our everyday lives, not just on certain occasions. For the \u201cenvironment\u201d in\nits broadest sense, consists of all the conditions in which we live. Our whole\nexistence depends completely on those conditions, and we ignore them at our\nperil. The Middle Way also fundamentally requires us to address conditions around\nus as well as within us, so that to suggest that Buddhists could ignore\nenvironmental issues would involve the strangest of narrow assumptions. We\ncannot ignore the environment that supports our bodies any more than, when\nmeditating, we can ignore our bodies and simply dwell in our minds. The\nenvironment constantly affects our bodies just as the body affects the mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key\nmetaphysical idea which tends to affect our attitudes to the environment is\nthat of \u201cnature\u201d. For some reason we traditionally tend to see the world beyond\nhuman beings as acting in a coherent, orderly, even intelligent way that we\nlabel \u201cnatural\u201d. This type of belief has taken many forms, from the Natural Law\nfirst promoted by the Stoics, the Christian version in which Nature is designed\nby God and is a reflection of his glory, through to modern versions such as the\nGaia Hypothesis, where the world is likened to a single organism, and Deep\nEcology, which accords the natural world an inherent dignity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All of these\nare dogmatic metaphysical constructions which have no relationship to the\nMiddle Way, for all of them involve constructing an idea of \u201cNature\u201d which is\nin fact in our image, whether that is to say that it was made for us or to say\nthat it is other than us. Whenever we start relating to an idea of \u201cnature\u201d\nrather than simply to a set of specific conditions, there is a constant\ntemptation to over-generalise and to apply our idea of \u201cnature\u201d dogmatically.\nIf there is a cycle of predation whereby different species live on each other\nand support each other in a stable mutual dependency, this is not due to a\n\u201cBalance of Nature\u201d, for we have not seen the whole of nature, only this\nparticular stable mutual dependency. If traditionally we have been able to live\nso far by consuming both animals and plants, it does not make it \u201cnatural\u201d to\neat both rather than just one or the other, nor does it indicate that things\nwere designed to be that way by God. If foxes eat rabbits, this is not because\n\u201cNature is red in tooth and claw\u201d, it just means that foxes eat rabbits, and\nperhaps that we are mildly shocked by observing violence between animals which\nis beyond our personal experience. Similarly, if we see a mountain at sunset\nand find the sight majestic, this does not mean that the mountain has some sort\nof \u201cnatural\u201d personality enabling it to have personal majesty, only that we are\nawestruck by the particular experience we encounter when mountain, light, and\nour receptive observation come together. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belief in\n\u201cNature\u201d can provide support for unreflective exploitation of resources on the\none hand, or sentimental attachment to them on the other. For many centuries\nthe dominant Western attitude to the environment has involved the assumption\nthat \u201cNature\u201d has infinite resources and can be exploited indefinitely. This\nhad a tendency to prevent people examining the effects of their actions on the\nenvironment, blithely unaware that resources like metal ores, oil and coal are\nfinite and non-renewable and others like timber, fish and soil still finite and\nfragile even though renewable. Pollution of all types was also blithely assumed\nto be simply absorbed by Nature. The idea of Nature as a Mother perhaps reveals\nthe psychological tendency behind this: when immature we simply assume that\nmother will always provide for us, will always be there to help, and can\nlovingly absorb whatever tantrums we throw at her. But Nature is not a Mother.\nNature does not even exist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other\nhand, the idea of \u201cNature\u201d is a rallying point for many environmentalists who\nfeel that Nature needs to be defended against a human onslaught. Yet we are in\nno position to defend Nature in general, only some tiny part of it.\nUnfortunately the part we want to defend tends to be a part we are already\nsentimentally or aesthetically attached to, and \u201cNature\u201d becomes the basis of\nmere conservatism, resisting change even when this would have positive effects.\nFor one example, many people believe that it is \u201cnatural\u201d for the uplands of\nNorthern England, Wales and Scotland to be mainly sheep pasture, despite the\nfact that this is an entirely human-made landscape created after the\ndestruction of earlier forest, and that sheep farming is only made economically\npossible by huge subsidies. These areas are highly suited to the erection of\nwind turbines, which could generate useful electricity without pollution or\nresource loss, yet huge campaigns are under way in many of these areas to\nprevent turbines being erected because of attachment to this landscape, where a\nnarrower conception of what is \u201cnatural\u201d takes precedence over the bigger\npicture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a starting\npoint for the resolution of problems in environmental ethics using the Middle\nWay, then, I propose that we begin by entirely expunging the terms \u201cNature\u201d and\neven \u201cnatural\u201d from our thinking, certainly not using them in any way as a\nsource of value. When we are tempted to talk of \u201cnature\u201d we should simply ask\nourselves what we really mean and put things in more precise terms. For\nenvironmental issues are just that: a whole series of (very serious and\ninterconnected) issues, which we should look at one by one by examining the\nspecific conditions at work as much as we can, not by making sweeping\njudgements either for or against \u201cnature\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buddhism\nparticularly helps to highlight that there are psychological conditions at work\nhere as well as physical, chemical, biological, geographical, sociological and\npolitical ones, and we need to address these just as much. There is no value in\nsimply stating that we \u201cought\u201d to recycle, stop polluting etc if our\nego-identifications are wholly set against doing so, for we need to work with\nadapting these as well as the physical conditions. Nor, given the limited scope\nand influence of law in a modern democratic society, can we simply claim that\npolitical action to save the environment is needed without taking\nresponsibility for our personal role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the\nremainder of this chapter, I will be looking at a number of areas of life in\nwhich environmental issues arise, and suggesting a general approach for their\nresolution given the Middle Way. As always this will not allow absolutely\ncomplete answers in particular cases, and solutions to specific environmental\nproblems often depend on detailed scientific knowledge which is far beyond the\nscope of this book. However, in a general book about ethics like this it is\npossible to sketch out the likely course of a justifiable moral balance in\nrelation to the environment as in other areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Farming and food<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Human beings\nneed food, and a large proportion of that food depends on farming. Although fishing\nstill provides a major alternative source of food, this is nearly always\nsupplementary to farmed food, and hunting and foraging for wild plants now\nprovide only a tiny proportion of the food eaten by the world\u2019s population. So,\nwe are enormously dependent on the world\u2019s farmers, and their task is perhaps\nthe most important one in human society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However,\nfarmers are directly in contact with some of the environmental conditions on\nwhich we most rely. Any kind of crop needs varying quantities of sunlight,\nwater and fertile soil, and in the absence of sufficient of these three things\nfarming is unsustainable. Crops are also vulnerable to competition from other\nplants (weeds), consumption by insects and larger animals, being spoilt by\nadverse weather, disease or fungi, or poisoned by human chemicals. Even when\nfarmers have overcome these obstacles (as they often do) through care and\ningenuity, they can still find that the market for their crops is insufficient\nto make them economically viable. Although we still grow enough to feed the\nworld\u2019s population at present (despite localised famines in some developing\ncountries), our doing so depends on all these fragile conditions continuing to\noperate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Our agriculture\nis seriously threatened in the long term by a combination of many changing\nconditions: limited soil fertility, widespread soil erosion (often associated\nwith deforestation), salinisation, desertification, droughts, too much human\ndemand for water, new influxes of weeds and pests which have spread around the\nworld, diseases threatening vital pollinating insects such as bees, extreme\nweather conditions such as hurricanes and floods, unpredictable changes in\nconsumer demand, public reaction against poisoning of crops and water by herbicides,\npesticides and fertilisers, and dependency on government subsidies which may be\nwithdrawn. Farmers that keep animals also have further problems of animal\ndiseases, the effects of widespread over-grazing on pasture, and the moral\nbacklash against the cruelties of modern animal farming in some sectors of the\npopulation (there will be more discussion of this in the next chapter, which\nfocuses on animals).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Added to all\nthese problems is the major issue of land use. The more land that is used for\nother human purposes, or made unusable for agriculture by changes of the kind\nmentioned above, the more pressure there will be on remaining agricultural\nland, increasing the likelihood of it, too, being degraded by unsustainable\nuse. Increasing population adds to the pressure, as does increasing consumption\nof meat and dairy products in the world, for animal husbandry takes up huge\namounts more land than crop-growing (in the case of grain-fed cattle for\nexample, about ten times more land is required to produce the same amount of\nhuman food, because of the amount fed to the cattle).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To farm\nsuccessfully in the long-term means addressing a whole host of conditions. Not\nonly do farmers have to make a\nliving from the land whilst maintaining all the positive conditions for growth\nthat their crops or animals need and fending off negative conditions, but they\nalso need to do so sustainably whilst not reducing the long-term fertility of\nthe land or harming other conditions important to creatures on the earth. If we\nadd to this some consideration of the sustainability of the task for the\nfarmer, including his or her psychological health in a job involving many\npressures, insecurity and often very long hours of work, we get an extremely\ndemanding profession.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, should a\nBuddhist be a farmer? Unquestionably yes, for farming is a right livelihood on\nwhich the rest of human society absolutely depends. To earn that livelihood,\nthe farmer certainly has to protect his\/her crop, which certainly means some\ndestruction, of plants if not of animals. Traditional Buddhist objections to\nthis seem to be based on considerations of purity rather than on Middle Way\nethics, for far from recognising the conditions at work in the growing of food\nto support human society, they create an irresolvable conflict with those\nconditions by (at least theoretically) requiring absolute non-violence. Farmers\nneed to exercise skill, balance and wisdom in their use of violence, but even\narable farming is impossible without some violence against living organisms.\nBuddhist farmers should not store any residual or even theoretical guilt about\nthis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, to be\na farmer whilst extending ego-identification beyond the mere immediate earning\nof a livelihood demands that a Buddhist farmer also address sustainability\nissues. Crop growing needs to be held in balance with other uses of land which\nenable a sustainable climate and supports wildlife (such as pollinating and\npest-eating insects) on which farming depends, so the further destruction of\nforests, hedges and other wildlife habitats for the sake of short-term\nefficiency is unlikely to be supported by the Middle Way. It also seems safe to\nsuggest that a Buddhist farmer should farm organically, since organic farming\nis indefinitely sustainable and avoids unnecessary pollution and\nresource-wastage in the wider environment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why should a\nfarmer do these things, when the job is difficult enough already? The strongest\nanswer is that in broadening his\/her identifications from mere present needs\ninto the future, the farmer will develop and grow in character. Addressing the\nfuture in some ways makes it easier to address it in others: for example,\norganic production makes it much more likely that the farm will be fit to pass\non to the farmer\u2019s children. Openness to the environment creates awareness and\nenjoyment of it which is its own reward, in contrast to the closed mind of the\nfarmer who only looks at his\/her land in short-term economic terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This kind of\nopenness to the wider environment and future human welfare might also require a\nfarmer to think much more radically about the best use of his\/her land than is\ncustomary. For example, should it be in agricultural production at all? Would\nit be better used for forestry or recreation? Tradition in a particular area dictates\nthat land is used in a particular way, for example, sheep grazing in upland\nareas: but the best use of that land might involve a complex mixture of\nforestry, crops, orchards and recreation according to the exact nature of the\nland. Bio-fuels and wind turbines might offer other new possibilities for\nprofitable and sustainable use of the land. This alternative use might actually\nincrease sustainable human food production by making more effective long-term\nuse of the land and supporting agriculture elsewhere, e.g. pasture turned into\nforest is helping to prevent deforestation and preserve water supplies needed\nin other areas, instead of requiring grain to be grown elsewhere to provide\nsupplementary feed to animals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, the key\nmoral requirement for farmers following the Middle Way seems to be an open\nconsideration of the complex environmental factors at work, rather than being\nunder the power of convention and habit in farming practices. Naturally an\nappreciation of wider environmental conditions also needs to be balanced with\nthe immediate needs of earning a livelihood, but in the longer-term livelihood\nand wider concerns are likely to be much more in harmony. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Any farmer who\ntakes on a farm will do so in specific concrete circumstances which then need\nto be worked with. Adaptation from inappropriate and short-termist farming\npractices to long-termist ones may take a long time, so one cannot be too\nclosely prescriptive about what the farm of a Buddhist farmer should be like.\nHowever, one would certainly expect that from whatever starting point, it would\nbe moving towards more organic forms of crop-growing, phasing out animal\nhusbandry (which will be discussed more in the next chapter) and diversifying\nhabitats. In some conditions, especially where heavy government subsidies work\nagainst these tendencies, there may be strong contrary conditions and it may\ntake a very long time to make progress in these directions, but one would\nexpect some progress to be being made.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the rest\nof us, we have a strong responsibility to support farmers in these moves by\nincreasing demand for food which is produced in a sustainable way and\ndecreasing demand for unsustainably-produced food. Without this support,\nfarmers will struggle in vain to earn a livelihood whilst changing to more\nsustainable production. Since it is farming which actually has an impact on the\nland and hence the condition of our environment, it is the impact of our food\nchoices on farmers which are important rather than their purity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key\ndecisions we can make here will be familiar to many: we can buy\nlocally-produced food to avoid the huge expenditure of resources in\ntransporting food huge distances, we can buy organic food which encourages\norganic production, and we can buy plant produce to avoid the destructive\nenvironmental effects and massive direct and indirect land use involved in\nanimal husbandry. In opening up our sensitivity to all these conditions we help\nto broaden ego-identification, but if we become attached to an ideal of purity\nin relation to any of them it can begin to close down again. Such purity is in\nany case difficult to achieve in today\u2019s complex food markets. We nearly always\nhave to trade off different factors in deciding what food to buy, since some of\nthe available organic food may have been imported some distance, or some of the\nfood available as an alternative to animal produce may not be organic. To take\na simple example, vegetarians and vegans often consume large amounts of soya\nproducts, but soya cannot currently be produced economically in the UK and thus\nis always imported. Given the huge advantages of soya as a flexible,\nnutritious, and sustainable food source, perhaps it is worth making that\ntrade-off for UK vegetarians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the\nreasons why demand for organic, locally-produced and vegetarian food is now\ngrowing rapidly throughout the Western world often has little to do with the\nenvironmental reasons I have outlined. Many people buy such food either because\nof beliefs about its health benefits or for aesthetic reasons: fresh, local,\norganic food tastes better. Whilst there is nothing intrinsically bad about\neither of these motivations, they are less likely to involve us in widening\nego-identification than the environmental benefits. It is quite possible to\nstart with either of these motivations and to widen them into environmental\nconcern – a process which should be encouraged – but to stay with them alone\ncan lead to a hardening of identification and to a culture of exclusivity. Rich\ngourmets who enjoy organic food, for example, might not be too concerned that\nthe price of it goes down enough to allow others to buy it, and might even\ncontinue to support industrial agriculture to keep the masses happy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Improving our food-buying habits also involves trading environmental concerns with convenience. The use of supermarkets, which are very convenient for consumers but exert huge economic pressures on farmers, is a highly debatable issue: should we be encouraging supermarkets to stock the right products or boycotting them entirely? Similarly, the use of packaged convenience foods which save time but create rubbish can be debated. If you suddenly decide to do all your shopping by bicycle or on foot, only use small shops, and only buy fresh whole food, as well as only buying organic, vegetarian or vegan, and locally-produced food, you may find that not all of these moral desirables can be put together in your neighbourhood, at least not without considerable expense and inconvenience. Again, it is more important to maintain some moral awareness in all these areas and to take opportunities to make progress in them than to achieve purity.\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 So, overall, environmental sustainability needs to be an important factor in the choices we make in relation to food, whether in relation to producing it or to consuming it. The Middle Way suggests that we should give the wider addressing of conditions involved in addressing the environmental impact of food production higher priority than narrower concerns such as those of health or taste, though there is rarely any conflict between these concerns. The Middle Way also suggests that it is maintaining awareness of a wide range of ways we can improve our food ethics, and maintaining a balance between them, rather than aiming for purity in one respect or another, which aids progress in addressing conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Go to main page for this book<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

\u0001<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"From Chapter 1: What is Buddhist Ethics? The need for ethics Ethics, or morality, is the way in which we judge our actions. If we consider any action \u201cright\u201d or \u201cwrong\u201d we are making a moral judgement. If I make a decision to buy fairtrade coffee, or if I disapprove of President George Bush\u2019s decision […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":386,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_oct_exclude_from_cache":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-440","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/440"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=440"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/440\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":441,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/440\/revisions\/441"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/386"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=440"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}