In\nthis chapter, I want to offer an account of truth that challenges most of the\nhabitual ways of talking about it, both in Western philosophy and in wider\nWestern discussion. It is essential to get this groundwork clear before moving\nonto discussion of ethics, politics, or any other more immediately practical\ntopics, because it is our assumptions about truth that shape our understanding\nof all other topics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since\nancient times, both in Greek and Indian traditions of thought, thinkers known\nas sceptics have been pointing out the hollowness of all our pretensions to\nknow the truth about anything. Very often these thinkers have been perceived as\ndestructive and negative in intention, or dismissed as impractical. Even when\nthey have been recognised as valuably stimulating further thought by\nquestioning accepted dogmas, the full value of what they offer has often not\nbeen recognised because it was regarded as peripheral. However, the recognition\nof our lack of direct access to truth is exactly where philosophy needs to\nbegin, for ultimately practical reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sceptics\nhave offered many arguments[1]<\/a>, but here are a few of the key ones in\nsummary:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such\narguments do not prove any given belief to be false<\/em>, but they crucially challenge all claims to certainty. <\/p>\n\n\n\n There\nis nothing intrinsically negative about such arguments, for such arguments work\njust as effectively against negative assertions as against positive ones. If I\ntake these sceptical arguments seriously, for example, I cannot claim to know\nthe truth either about God\u2019s existence or about his non-existence, for the\nstatement \u2018God does not exist\u2019 can be just as easily subjected to these\ndifferent kinds of sceptical doubt as the claim that he does. Similarly, the\nclaim that there is not a table in front of me is just as much subject to\nsceptical doubt as the claim that there is. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor\nis it \u2018negative\u2019 merely to challenge any given belief, for such challenges are\nessential for the improvement of beliefs. Sceptical arguments do not (as is\noften assumed) imply that we should give up all beliefs, only that we cannot be\ncertain that our beliefs are true. If we believe our beliefs are true we must\nbe deluded, and scepticism thus helps us get closer to the truth by uncovering\ndeluded versions of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sceptical\narguments have only ever been challenged either by dogmatically asserting a\nsupposedly unassailable, foundational truth (such as my own existence, or God\u2019s\nexistence), or by changing the meaning of the term \u2018certainty\u2019 to fit everyday\nusage. Descartes provides an example of the former approach by building his\nphilosophy on the foundational certainty of his own existence. However, he\ncould only \u2018prove\u2019 his own existence as certain by assuming that his\nself-conscious experience at a given moment was conclusive evidence for a\npermanent and unchanging self \u2013 a massive over-interpretation of limited\nevidence[2]<\/a>. G.E. Moore can provide an example of\nthe other kind of challenge. He asserted that he was certain of the existence\nof his hand because of the lack of positive counter-evidence (I have no reason\nto disbelieve in my hand\u2019s existence)[3]<\/a>. This is a moving of the goalposts\ntowards a more everyday sense of certainty, but no proof of absolute<\/em> certainty that he had a hand[4]<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Our\nlack of absolute certainty requires recognition too constantly to allow any\ndistraction from the sceptics\u2019 central points. Contrary to the assumptions of\nmany philosophers, our lack of absolute certainty is of great practical\nimportance. If we are to bear in mind the real possibility of being wrong, even\nwhen there is no immediate evidence available to us that we might be, or nobody\npresent casting doubt on our ideas, then the possibility of being wrong needs\nto be at the very basis of our philosophical attitudes. History is littered\nwith examples of false certainty, from the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition,\nMarxism, and Fascism to the long-held certainty (challenged by environmental\ncircumstances more recently) that the planet has inexhaustible resources meant\nfor our use and an infinite capacity to absorb the effects of our activities. It\nis only the recognition that we might be wrong that can potentially restrain\nthe hand inspired by false certainty in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We\ndo not have direct access to the truth, and what we often take to be \u2018truth\u2019 is\nmerely belief certified by the group in which we live, or belief for which\nthere is some positive justification. It is all too easy to acknowledge\nintellectually that we have no such direct access to truth, but then perhaps five\nyears later, in the press of whatever expectations society imposes on us, to\nonce again, let this point slip and start thinking of our beliefs as \u2018true\u2019.\nAlternatively we might start using the concept of truth, perhaps with a few\ntheoretical hedges, as the basis of judgement: a unjustified move given our\nlack of access to truth. We cannot afford to leave the sceptics on the edge of\nthe discussion: their contribution needs to be a starting point, constantly\nborne in mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There\nis no practical alternative, if we want to operate with a consistently adequate\ndegree of intellectual humility, to the complete abandonment of claims to truth,\nwhether negative or positive, or of any other kind of appeal to truth. Quite\nsimply, we are not God, and we do not have access to the infinite knowledge\nthat God, if he exists, would have. Thus we are not justified in appealing to\ntruth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless,\nthis does not mean that we cannot use the concept of truth meaningfully, or\nthat we cannot apply justification, short of claiming truth, to our judgements.\nTruth has not disappeared below the horizon, but it is on the edge<\/em> of that horizon, in a position where we can talk\nmeaningfully of it in a rather abstract way, but not grasp it or rely on\nknowledge of it. We need to constantly adapt to the full implications of truth\nbeing on the edge<\/em>. I will return below\nto the argument that justification does not depend on truth, but more\nimmediately, next, to the question of the meaningfulness of the idea of truth. [1]<\/a>\nFor the ancient Greek sceptical arguments see Sextus Empiricus, trans. Benson Mates\n(1996) The Skeptic Way: Sextus\nEmpiricus\u2019s Outlines of Pyrrhonism<\/em> Oxford University Press, New York<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> See A\ntheory of moral objectivity 3.f.ix for a more detailed discussion of\nDescartes\u2019 assumptions in his context<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> See G.E.\nMoore \u2018Proof of an external world\u2019 from G.E.Moore: Selected Writings ed.\nT. Baldwin, Routledge 1993.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Some philosophers also consider the assumptions of scepticism to have been undermined by Wittgenstein\u2019s private language argument. For a refutation of Wittgenstein\u2019s argument please see A theory of moral objectivity 4.e.iii: Wittgenstein relies on dogmatic assertions of what is \u201cmeaningful\u201d or \u201cmeaningless\u201d. Scepticism in any case does not require the solipsistic assumption of an isolated self that Wittgenstein wants to attack, only a recognition of the lack of ultimate justification for our assumptions, howsoever formed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2026\u2026\u2026…<\/p>\n\n\n\n Abandoning\nclaims to truth, but nevertheless retaining justification, has immense\nimplications, that much of the rest of this book will be exploring. Here are\nsome of the most crucial implications:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nFrom truth to\njustification<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Go to main page for this book<\/a><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"From chapter 1: Truth on the edge In this chapter, I want to offer an account of truth that challenges most of the habitual ways of talking about it, both in Western philosophy and in wider Western discussion. It is essential to get this groundwork clear before moving onto discussion of ethics, politics, or any […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":384,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_oct_exclude_from_cache":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-436","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/436"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=436"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/436\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":438,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/436\/revisions\/438"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/384"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=436"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}